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PRATT v. SUMNER: NOTHING FRIVOLOUS 
HERE 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Pratt v. Sumner! the Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiff 
raised legal issues pertaining to the constitutionality of a total 
ban on a felony prisoner's receipt of books from sources other 
than bookstores and publishers that neither the Supreme Court 
nor the Ninth Circuit had resolved.2 Accordingly, the court con-
cluded that Pratt's complaint alleging that he was denied mean-
ingful access to the courts was not frivolous and had to be re-
viewed by the district court.3 
The Nevada State Prison "publisher or bookstore only" reg-
ulation provides that all hard-cover and soft-cover books sent to 
prisoners be returned unless they originate from a publisher or 
bookstore.· Pratt6 solicited law professors for legal texts tnat 
they had authored. Books sent to Pratt by the law professors 
were returned by prison officials." 
1. 807 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1987) (per Reinhardt, J.; the other panel members were 
Alarcon, J. and Boochever, J.). 
2. Id. at 820. 
3.ld. 
4. Id. at 818. 
5. Id. "Ray Donald Pratt is an inmate at the Nevada Stete Prison, a maximum se-
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Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,1 Pratt brought this civil rights 
action claiming that he was denied meaningful access to the 
courts because the law books were returned. Pratt alleged that 
law professor James Jeans sent a soft-cover copy of his book, 
Trial Advocacy,S and that without notice or a hearing, the 
prison officials returned the book to Jeans.8 Pratt alleged that 
the "publisher or bookstore only" regulation was overly broad 
and that the information in the text was not otherwise available 
to him because of deficiencies in the prison's law library.lO Pratt 
sought a declaratory judgment, arguing first that notice and a 
hearing were required before such printed materials could be re-
turned. Second, he contended that the soft-cover books were not 
a threat to security and should not be banned under a "publish-
ers or bookstore only" regulation. Third, Pratt argued that law 
books should receive preferential treatment. Finally, he sought 
damages and injunctive relief.l1 
The action was submitted to a magistrate to determine 
whether Pratt should be allowed to proceed without payment of 
filing fees.12 The magistrate allowed him to do so but concluded 
that the action was frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) and that 
the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction. IS The district court 
adopted the magistrate's recommendation and dismissed the 
complaint.H Pratt appealed pro se to the Ninth Circuit. 
Id. 
7. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982). Section 1983 provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regu-
lation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the Dis-
trict of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citi-
zen of the United States or other person within the 
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of a rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be lia-
ble to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
8. J. Jeans, Trial Advocacy (1975). 
9. Pratt,807 F.2d at 818. 
10.Id. 
11. Id. The damages that Pratt sought were the cost of the book, punitive damages 
in the amount of the book and postage costs for James Jeans. Id. 
12. Id. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 provides for proceedings in forma pauperis which allow any 
court to waive the payment of fees and costs provided that the person seeking the waiver 
makes an affidavit that he is unable to pay such costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982). 
13. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 818. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) provides in pertinent part that U[t]he 
court ... may dismiss the case if the allegation of poverty is untrue, or if satisfied that 
the action is frivolous and malicious." 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d) (1982). 
14. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 819. 
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II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
In Pratt l5 the Ninth Circuit considered the propriety of the 
district court's dismissal of Pratt's complaint for lack of subject 
matter jurisdiction and on the merits. IS The Ni~th Circuit ex-
plained that a complaint can be dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion when it is "wholly insubstantial and frivolous.,,!1 It also 
noted that because the action was submitted pursuant to 28 
U.S.C. § 1915,18 it could be dismissed if it was "frivolous or mali-
cious. "111 The court defined a frivolous action as one which 
lacked an arguable basis in law or fact.20 
To analyze whether Pratt's complaint was frivolous, the 
Ninth Circuit examined Bell v. Wolfish,21 a Supreme Court case 
about regulations affecting the receipt of hard-cover books by 
inmates. In Wolfish, pretrial detainees brought a class action 
suit challenging the constitutionality of conditions at a short-
term federal correctional facility.22 The Supreme Court ad-
dressed the facility's "publishers only" reguiation that limited 
the books and magazines that detainees could receive to those 
mailed from publishers or book clubs.23 The Supreme Court held 
that a "publisher and bookstore only" regulation limited to 
hard-cover books was a reasonable time, place, and manner re-
striction and did not violate the first amendment.24 The Court 
explained that hard-cover books are difficult to search effectively 
and that contraband could be easily smuggled in the bindings. It 
concluded that the limited restriction was a reasonable response 
to the government's interest in prison security.25 
15. 807 F.2d 817 (9th Cir. 1987). 
16. [d. at 819. 
17. Pratt v. Sumner, 807 F.2d 817, 819 (9th Cir. 1987) (quoting Bell v. Hood, 327 
U.S. 678, 682·83 (1946». 
18. 28 U.S.C. § 1915 (1982). 
19. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 819. 
20. [d. This definition had been previsouly used by the Ninth Circuit in Franklin v. 
Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221, 1225 (9th Cir. 1984). [d. 
21. 441 U.S. 520 (1979). 
22. [d. at 523. The Supreme Court defined pretrial detainees as "those persons who 
have been charged with a crime but who have not yet been tried on the charge." [d. 
23. [d. at 549. 
24. [d. at 550-52. The Court noted, however, that it did not express a view "as to the 
validity of those portions of the lower courts' rulings that concern magazine or soft-cover 
books." [d. at 550 n. 31. 
25. [d. at 550-51. 
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The Ninth Circuit noted that the Wolfish Court's holding 
was influenced by factors that were not present in the instant 
case.26 In Wolfish, soft-cover books were not susceptible to the 
"publisher or bookstore only" regulation and, therefore, soft-
cover books were viewed as alternatives to obtaining hard-cover 
reading material. In Pratt, there were no such alternatives be-
cause the "publishers or bookstore only" regulation applied to 
both soft-cover and hard-cover books.2 '1 Also the policy in Wolf-
ish affected pretrial detainees who were incarcerated for not 
more than 60 days where Pratt was serving a felony sentence 
presumed to be significantly longer.28 The Ninth Circuit rea-
soned that, because Pratt's complaint concerned a soft-cover 
book and there were differing factors involved, his complaint 
raised issues that the Supreme Court had not decided.29 
The court noted that the two Supreme Court casesSO on 
which the district court had relied did not involve the first 
amendment or an inmate's complaint that he was denied mean-
ingful access to the courts.S1 The Ninth Circuit then distin-
guished the Fifth Circuit decision in Guajardo v. Estelie,32 
which upheld a "publisher and bookstore only" regulation re-
garding publications in general.33 The Ninth Circuit reasoned 
that because Guajardo was decided before Wolfish, it could not 
rely on Guajardo's holding.3 • The court also explained that no 
case had examined a prohibition of books mailed directly from 
an author to inmates. 
26. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 819. 
[T]he Court in Wolfish was 'influenced by several other fac-
tors,' including (1) the fact that there were sufEcient, un-
burdensome alternative means oC obtaining reading materials, 
i.e., so/teover [sic] books Crom any source and a 'relatively 
large' library for inmate use and (2) the fact that the poli(;y 
affected only pretrial detainees, whose stays in the institution 
were limited to approximately 60 days. 
[d. (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 551-52 (1979» (emphasis in original). 
27. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 819-20. 
28. [d. 
29. [d. at 819. 
-30. Block v. RutherCord, 468 U.S. 576 (1984); Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 
(1984). 
31. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 818, 820. 
32. 580 F.2d 748 (5th Cir. 1978). 
33. [d. at 762. 
34. Pratt, 807 F.2d at 820. 
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The Ninth Circuit held that Pratt's claim was not frivolous 
because it raised legal issues that neither the Supreme Court nor 
the Ninth Circuit had decided. S5 The court, therefore, reversed 
the judgment below and remanded the case to the district 
court. at 
lli. CONCLUSION 
The Ninth Circuit carefully examined the issues raised and 
relevant case law and found that neither the Supreme Court nor 
the Ninth Circuit had resolved the constitutionality of a total 
ban on felony inmates receiving books from sources other than 
publishers and bookstores. The court determined that Pratt's 
claim that he was denied meaningful access to the courts be-
cause prison officials returned law books sent by their authors 
constituted a bona fide complaint that deserved a hearing on its 
merits. 
Christopher W. Coffey· 
SMITH V. CITY OF FONTANA: NINTH 
CIRCUIT UPHOLDS CIVIL RIGHTS ACTION 
DESPITE STATE POST-DEPRIVATION 
REMEDIES 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In Smith v. City of Fontana, l the Ninth Circuit held, inter 
alia, that a civil rights action, brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,S 
35. [d. at 819-20. 
36. [d. tit 820. 
• Golden Gate University School of Law, Class of 1987 
I. 807 F.2d 796 (9th Cir. 1986)(per Norris, J.; the other panel members were Tang, 
J.; Alarcon, J.) 
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) provides in pertinent part: 
Every person who, under any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom or usage, of any State ••• subjects, or causes to be 
5
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could be maintained for violation of a decedent's substantive 
due process rights even where there exists a post-deprivation 
state remedy.3 The court also held that the constitutional inter-
est in familial companionship warranted children's claims for vi-
olation of their personal substantive due process rights when 
their father died as a result of excessive force used by two po-
licemen during his detention.4 Construing the facts most favora-
bly to the plaintiffs, since material disputes existed as to the fac-
tors necessary to state a substantive due process claim, the 
Ninth Circuit held that dismissal of the action was improper.& 
The court reversed and remanded to try the disputed issues.6 
The suit arose from the death of Rufus A. Smith, a black 
man, slain by two police officers during an investigation of a do-
mestic quarrel." The offi~ers detained Mr. Smith in the parking 
lot of his apartment complex to question him concerning an al-
leged domestic quarrel. a According to the allegations, as Mr. 
Smith attempted to comply with the officers' orders to place his 
hands on his head, the officers assaulted him.1I Mr. Smith was 
unarmed and offered only instinctive resistence against the at-
tack.1o One of the officers then drew his revolver and shot Mr. 
Smith in the back.ll Mr. Smith died later in surgery.l:I 
Plaintiffs brought suit in the federal district court against 
the two police officers, the City of Fontana and various city offi-
cials, claiming the defendants' conduct violated the due process 
Id. 
subjected, any citizen of the United States ••. to the depriva-
tion of any rights, privileges, or immunitiea secured by the 
constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceedings for 
redress. 
3. Smith, 807 F.2d at 798-99. 
4. Id. at 802. 
5. Id. at 799. The district court dismissed pursuant to FED. R CIY. P. 12(b)(6) which 
states the defense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Id. at 797. 
6. Smith, 807 F.2d at 805. 
7. Id. at 798. 
8.ld. 
9. Id. One officer clenched Mr. Smith in a chokehold while the other officer kneed 





Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 17, Iss. 1 [1987], Art. 5
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol17/iss1/5
1987] CIVIL RIGHTS 15 
and equal protection clauses of the fourteenth amendment, 13 
and the first, fourth, fifth and eighth amendments of the United 
States Constitution.14 Mrs. Smith sued as administratrix of the 
decedent's estate to vindicate Mr. Smith's Civil rights.111 Mrs. 
Smith and her children also sued to vindicate their own civil 
rights. UI The suit was brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.17 
The district court dismissed the action for failure to state a 
claim on the ground that California's post-deprivation remedies 
for violation of state tort law were sufficient to protect the plain-
tiffs from suffering any cognizable constitutional injury.18 The 
Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded.18 
II. THE COURT'S ANALYSIS 
The Ninth Circuit began its analysis by reviewing Parratt v. 
Taylor,20 a Supreme Court case relied upon by the district court, 
and found that dismissal of plaintiffs' 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims 
was improper.21 
In Parratt v. Taylor,22 the Supreme Court held that a 
state's post-deprivation remedy satisfied constitutional due pro-
cess when a state actor negligently deprived a prisoner of a mi-
13. [d. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 states in pertinent part: "[No State shall) de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny 1<> any 
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.s. CONST. amend. )tIV 
§ 1. 





19. [d. at 805. 
20. 451 U.S. 527 (198l). According to Parrott, in a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action, two 
essential elements must be present: (1) The conduct complained of must have been com-
mitted by a person acting under color of law; (2) The conduct must have deprived a 
person of rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution or laws of the 
United States. [d. at 531-35. Furthermore, to establish a valid fourteenth amendment 
claim, a deprivation must occur as a result of an established state procedure. [d. at 543. 
A state's post-deprivation remedies are adequate to protect a victim's due process rights. 
[d. at 538. 
21. Smith v. City of Fontana, 807 F.2d at 798. 
22. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled to the extent that mere lack of due care by a state 
official will not deprive an individual of life, liberty or property under the fourteenth 
amendment, 54 U.S.L.W. 4090·91 (1986). 
7
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nor property interest." The Ninth Circuit distinguished Parratt, 
finding that Parratt applied only when the state's post-depriva-
tion remedies are adequate to protect a victim's procedural due 
process rights. U Here, the court explained, the plaintiffs' sub-
stantive due process rights were violated25 for "the constitu-
tional violation [was] complete at the moment the action or dep-
rivation occur[red]."28 Procedural due process violations, on the 
other hand, occur when the state does not provide adequate 
safeguards surrounding the action.27 Therefore, the existence of 
a state post-deprivation remedy will not curtail a cause of action 
for violation of substantive due process under § 1983.28 
A. FOURTH AMENDMENT CLAIMS 
The court thus analyzed the claims that the officers' con-
duct and the city's policies violated the plaintiffs' fourth amend-
ment rights.211 The court held that while Mr. Smith's estate 
could bring suit on his behalf, Mr. Smith's children could not 
bring suit in their individual capacities.30 
The court noted that deadly force used in an apprehension 
or a detention is a seizure subject to the reasonableness require-
ments of the fourth amendment.lll A claim of excessive force 
23. Parratt, 451 U.S. at 541·44. A prison inmate had ordered hobby materials 
through the mail. The packages were lost through negligence by two prison employees. 
The Court held that the inmate could not state a § 1983 action for the state had a tort 
claims procedure which would have fully compensated the inmate for his property 1083. 
[d. at 530-44. 
24. Smith, 807 F.2d at 798-99 (emphasis in original). 
25. [d. (emphasis in original). 
26. [d. at 799. 
27. [d. 
28. [d. (quoting Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 780 F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1986». 
Since substantive due process is violated at the moment the harm occurs, "the existence 
of a post-deprivation state remedy should not have any bearing on whether a cause of 
action exists under § 1983." Rutherford, 780 F.2d at 1447. See Shah v. County of Los 
Angeles, 797 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1986) (Parratt did not bar a § 1983 suit. based on viola-
tions of substantive due process where complaint alleged sheriff's deputies assaulted and 
harassed plaintiff); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 780 (9th Cir. 1986) (availability of 
state court relief did not bar federal relief under § 1983 for alleged prison guard 
brutality). 
29. Smith, 807 F.2d at 799-801. 
30. [d. at BOO-01. 
31. [d. at 799-BOO. The fourth amendment. states in part. that the "right of the pe0-
ple to be secure in their persons • • . against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated ..•. " U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The fourth amendment was made appli-
8
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used during a personal seizure states a § 1983 claim for relief 
predicated on the fourth amendment.32 Such a claim must be 
analyzed in conjunction with such factors as the officer's safety, 
the reason for the apprehension, and the extent of injury 
inflicted.33 
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1988,34 a § 1983 claim that arose before 
death is actionable after death in California if brought by the 
decedent's administrator.35 Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit held 
that Mr. Smith's fourth amendment claim survived his death 
and could be brought by Mrs. Smith as administratrix of his es-
tate.3S However, since the Supreme Court has held that "Fourth 
Amendment rights are personal rights which. . . may not be vi-
cariously asserted,"37 Mr. Smith's children could not maintain 
personal causes of action under § 1983 for they were not directly 
subjected to the excessive use of force. U 
B. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS CLAIMS 
1. The Estate's Substantive Due Process Claim 
The district court in Smith v. City of Fontana found that 
cable to the states through the fourteenth amendment in Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 
(1949). 
32. Smith, S07 F.2d at 800. See Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(allegation of excessive force used while transporting plaintiffs states a § 1983 claim for 
fourth amendment violation); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (11th Cir. 1985) 
(alleged beating and killing of suspect during detention stated a § 1983 claim for fourth 
amendment violation). 
33. Smith, 807 F.2d at 800 (quoting McKenzie v. Lamb, 738 F.2d 1005, 1011 (9th 
Cir. 1984». See Tennesse v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)(lack of probable cause to believe 
suspect poses a threat of serious harm to officers or others constitutes an unreasonable 
seizure when deadly force is used to prevent escape). 
Id. 
34. 42 U.S.C § 1988 (1982) states in pertinent part: 
(Where the1laws of the United States .•• are deficient in the 
provisions necessary to furnish suitable remedies and punish 
offenses against law, the common law, as modified and 
changed by the constitution and statutes of the (forum1 State 
• • • 80 far as the same is not inconsistent with the Constitu-
tion and laws of the United States, (shall govern1. 
35. Smith, S07 F.2d at BOO. See CAL. PROD. CoDE § 573 (West Supp. 1986). "(NJo 
cause of action (is) lost by reason of the death of any person but may be maintained by 
... his ... administrator." CAL. PROD. CODE § 573 (West Supp. 1986). 
36. Smith, S07 F.2d at 800. 
37. Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969). 
38. Smith, S07 F.2d at SOl. 
9
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Mr. Smith's estate had asserted only a procedural due process 
claim under the fourteenth amendment.3il The Ninth Circuit 
held this ruling to be erroneous since it determined that the es-
tate correctly alleged a substantive due process claim under § 
1983.40 
In reaching this conclusion, the court relied on numerous 
circuit court decisions which held that flagrant government ac-
tions, such as the use of unwarranted violent physical force, con-
stitutes a violation of substantive due process.41 Such a claim 
must be analyzed in light of several factors to determine the rea-
sonableness of the officer's actions.42 Since triable issues of fact 
existed as to whether or not such factors were present in Smith, 
the dismissal was improper.43 
2. The Children's Personal Substantive Due Process Claim 
The Ninth Circuit, after an extensive discussion of case law 
and legislative history, held that the children of the decedent 
had validly stated a claim based on the violation of their per-
sonal substantive due process rights under § 1983. This claim 
arose out of the death of their father.44 
Although the Supreme Court has not yet determined if the 
death of a family member caused by a government act "deprives 
other family members of a cognizable liberty interest in con tin-
39. Id. (emphasis in the original). 
40. Id. (emphasis added). 
41. Id. See Shah v. County of Los Angeles, 797 F.2d 743 (9th Cir. 1986) (allegations 
of assault and harassment by sheriff deputies, if true, stated a violation of substantive 
due process); McRorie v. Shimoda, 795 F.2d 7SO (9th Cir. 1986) (brutality used during a 
strip search, if true, constituted a violation of substantive due process); Rutherford v. 
City of Berkeley, 7SO F.2d 1444 (9th Cir. 1986) (complaint alleging unprovoked assault 
and battery, if true, constituted a violation of substantive due process); Meredith v. Ari-
zona, 523 F.2d 481 (9th Cir. 1975) (unprovoked assault on prisoner suffering an attack of 
emphysema would constitute a violation of substantive due process). 
42. Smith, S07 F.2d at SOl. A court must look to the need for the application of 
force, the amount of force used, and the extent of the injury sustained. Id. The court 
must determine whether "the force was applied in a good faith effort to maintain and 
restore discipline or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm." 
Id. (quoting Rutherford v. City of Berkeley, 7SO F.2d 1444. 1446 (9th Cir. 1986) (quoting 
Johnson v. Glick. 481 F.2d 1028. 1033 (2d Cir. 1973). 
43. Smith. S07 F.2d at SOl. 
44.ld. 
10
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ued association with the decedent,"45 the Ninth Circuit found 
that substantive familial rights are basic civil rights of man-
1.dnd.41 In Morrison v. Jones," for example, the Ninth Circuit 
held that a mother could bring a § 1983 action for damages to 
vindicate her familial rights when county officials removed her 
mentally ill child from her custody on the grounds that she was 
incapable of providing adequate care for him.48 
III Kelson v. City of Springfield," parents brought an action 
under § 1983 for violations of their fundamental parental 
rights,IIO alleging that school officials negligently allowed their 
son to commit suicide. III The Kelson court held that the plain-
tiffs could maintain such an action for "a parent has a constitu-
tionally protected liberty interest in the companionship and so-
ciety of his or her child."112 The court in Smith, then, extended 
this liberty interest to protect children against state interference 
with their relat!onship with their parents without due process of 
law. liS 
Reviewing the legislative history of the forerunner of § 1983, 
the Ku Klux Klan Act,1I4 the Ninth Circuit found compelling 
support for their ruling.1I11 The Act was described as a remedy for 
wrongs committed "to the children whose father had been killed 
•••• "111 Thus, the court held that Mr. Smith's children could 
maintain a § 1983 claim for violation of their substantive due 
45.Id. 
46. Id. at 802 (quoting Morrison v. Jones, 607 F.2d 1269, 1276 (9th Cir. 1979», cert. 
denied, 445 U.s. 962 (1980), (quoting Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942». 
47. 607 F.2d 1269 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 962 (1980). 
48. Morrison, 607 F.2d at 1269. 
49. 767 F.2d 651 (9th Cir. 1985). 
SO. Id. at 653. The parents claimed the defendants violated their rights guaranteed 
by the first and ninth amendments without due process of law. Id. 
51.Id. 
52. Id. at 655. 
53. Smith, 807 F.2d at 802. The court noted that the Supreme Court case on which 
Morrison and Kelson relied concerned suits by parents of minor children. Nevertheless, 
the court did not believe this would justify protecting only parents and not children.Id. 
The court observed that an argument could be made that a child may have an even 
greater interest in the protection of parental relationships for though parents may have 
other biological children, a child cannot replace a biological parent. Id. at 802 n.9. 
54. Ku Klux Klan Act, c.22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
55. Smith, 807 F.2d at 803. 
56. See CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 807 (1871). 
11
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process rights under the fourteenth amendment.57 
C. EQUAL PROTECTION CLAIMS 
The estate alleged that Mr. Smith's right to equal protec-
tion was violated because the excessive force used in his deten-
tion was the result of the city's unwritten policy sanctioning 
such force against blacks. 58 The court concluded that the estate 
could maintain a survival action for damages, for if the allega-
tions were proven, a violation of equal protection based on race 
would stand. lit 
The children's equal protection challenge was based on pos-
sible future race-related discrimination through the use of exces-
sive force against blacks by the police department. 40 The chil-
dren alleged that the policy of the city and the propensity of the 
two police officers involved in the suit to engage in the use of 
excessive force, threatened the physical security of all black peo-
ple in the police department's jurisdiction.·1 
As with the estate's equal protection claim,SJ the court de-
termined that if the children's allegations were proven, a viola-
tion of equal protection would result. sa Therefore, the children 
validly asserted a cause of action for injunctive relief for viola-
tion of their fourteenth amendment equal protection rights.&4 
D. REMAINING CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIMS 
The Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly dis-
missed the plaintiffs' first, fifth, and eighth amendment claims. 
The court held that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon 
which relief could be granted.811 
57. Smith, 807 F.2d at 803. 
58.Id. 
59.Id. 
60. Id. at 804. 
61.Id. 
62. See supra text accompanying notes 59-60. 
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With respect to the first amendment claim, the o:.-ourt found 
that the complaint did not allege that the officet"a' conduct nor 
the city's policy interfered with the plaintiffs' right of free 
speech or association, except that the children's first amendment 
right to intimate association was relevant to the assertion of 
their substantive due process claim." The fifth amendment 
claim was properly dismissed as repetitive of the fourteenth 
amendment claim.'7 Finally, the dismissal of the eighth amend-
ment claim was sustained, ~ince that amendment protects only 
those who have been convicted of a crime." 
TIl. CONCLUSION 
In Smith, the Ninth Circuit upheld the right of a plaintiff to 
assert a claim under § 1983 for violation of the decedent's sub-
stantive due process rights in spite of the existence of a state 
tort remedy. The court determined that Pa"att v. Taylor 
barred such § 1983 claims only when they were limited to proce-
dural due process allegations. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit 
upheld the continued life of substantive due process claims 
under the fourteenth amendment. This decision preserves im-
portant federal avenues of legal redress for those who have been 
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